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Calendar
Oct. 6-Denver Bar Association, regular monthly meeting, 12:15 P. M.,
Chamber of. Commerce dining room.
Oct. 16-District Judges' Association annual meeting, County Judges' Association meeting, District Attorneys' Association meeting, Board of Governors meeting, Broadmoor Hotel, Colorado Springs.
Oct. 17-18-Colorado Bar Association annual meeting, Broadmoor Hotel,
Colorado Springs.
Nov. 3-Denver Bar Association, regular monthly meeting, 12:15 P. M.,
Chamber of Commerce Dining Room.

49th Annual Meeting
of the
Colorado Bar Association
BROADMOOR HOTEL, COLORADO SPRINGS

PROGRAM
Thursday, October 16, 1947
10:00 a.m. District Judges Association-Conference-Judge Claude C. Coffin, Ft. Collins, President, presiding.
10:00 a.m. County Judges Association-Judge Christian D. Stoner of Golden,
President, presiding.
Meeting called to order.
Round table discussion-"Why Bills Sponsored by County Judges
Failed."
Open discussion of problems of the county judge.
2:00 p.m. Peter Holme, Jr., will discuss the findings of the Judiciary committee.
Open discussion of judges regarding Colorado judicial system and
committee's recommendations.
2:00 p.m. Board of Governors-Fifth Floor Suite.
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Fridcry. October 17, 1947
10:00 a.m. Probate, Real Estate and Trust Law Section-Little Theatre.
Albert S. Isbill of Denver, Chairman, presiding.
Joint meeting with committee on Real Estate Standards-Edwin
J. Wittleshofer of Denver, Chairman. This meeting is open to
all members of the association and the county judges.
Percy S. Morris-"Foreign Wills and the 1947 Amendments with
Reference Thereto."
Pierpont Fuller-"1947 Amendments in General and Necessary
Changes and Procedure."
Edwin J. Wittleshofer-"Real Estate Title Standards."
10:00 a.m. Water Section-Ballroom.
Malcolm Lindsey of Denver, Chairman, presiding.
"Conference on Current Water Rights Problems."
10:00 a.m. District Attorneys Association-Palm Court.
Irl Foard of Colorado Springs, President, presiding.
10:00 a.m. Junior Bar Section-Golf Club.
Wilbur E. Rocchio of Denver, President, presiding.
business meeting and election of officers.

General

10:30 a.m. Board of Governors-Fifth Floor Suite.
Milton J. Keegan of Denver, President, presiding.
12:00 p.m. Entire association Luncheon-Dining Room.
Leonard H. Haynie of Alamosa, Vice President, presiding.
The Law Club of Denver will present "Trial by Jury" by Gilbert
and Sullivan. Win. Hedges Robinson, Jr., President; Charles J.
Beise, Program Chairman.
2:00 p.m. General Open Meeting-Auspices of Junior Bar Section.
Leonard H. Haynie of Alamosa, Vice President, presiding.
Wilbur E. Rocchio of Denver, Chairman.
"Economic and Industrial Development of Colorado and Rocky
Mountain Empire"-Robert L. Stearns; John L. Morach, United
Steel Workers, C. I. 0.; Dr. Frederick Rohrman, Department of
Research, University of Colorado.
3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Tea for the ladies in attendance. Hostesses are Mrs.
Thomas M. Burgess and Mrs. Merril E. Shoup-at home of Mrs.
Shoup, 17 Broadmoor Avenue, Broadmoor.
8:00 p.m. Ice Show-Broadmoor Ice Palace.
Auspices of El Paso Bar Association.
9:30 p.m. Dancing-Ballroom.
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Saturday. October 18, 1947
10:00 a.m. General Open Meeting-Little Theatre.
Auspices Committee on Judicial Administration-Philip S. Van
Cise of Denver, Chairman; Stanley H. Johnson of Denver, Executive Secretary.
12:00 p.m. Entire Association Luncheon-Dining Room.
James K. Groves of Grand Junction, Senior Vice President,
presiding.
Speaker: Will Shafroth of Washington, D. C.
Subject: "Modern Aids in Court Administration."
Mr. Shafroth is chief of the Division of Procedural Studies and
Statistics, Administration Office of the United States Courts.
2:00 p.m. General Session-Little Theatre.
Erskine R. Myer of Denver, Vice President, presiding.
Milton J. Keegan: President's Address.
Report 6f Judiciary Committee.
Report of Nominating Committee.
Unfinished Business.
New Business.
Special Orders.
Election of Officers.
Adjournment.
6:00 p.m. Cocktail Party-Mezzanine.
Compliments of the Broadmoor Hotel.
7:00 p.m. Annual Banquet-Ballroom-Informal.
Milton J. Keegan of Denver, President, presiding.
Presentation of guests and new officers of association.
Speaker: Hon. John J. Parker of Charlotte, North Carolina.
Judge Parker, who is Senior United States Circuit Judge of the
Fourth Circuit, served as America's alternate member on the
International Military Tribunal which sat at the Nuremburg
Trials. In 1943 he was awarded the gold medal of the American
Bar Association for conspicuous service in the cause of American
jurisprudence.
9:30 p.m. Dancing-Ballroom.
Hotel Accommodations
Broadmoor Hotel, Colorado Springs, convention hotel. Overflow will be
accommodated at other hotels in the city. Rates for this meeting will be:
regular rooms, $4.00 per person (double-no singles available); lanai suite,
$7.00 per person, double; $3.50 per third person. All reservations should be
addressed to manager, Broadmoor Hotel, Colorado Springs.
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Upon Information and Belief
The Annual Meeting
Every Colorado lawyer who can possibly do so should plan to be present
at the annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Association in Colorado Springs,
October 17 and 18, to help decide the important questions which will be up
for decision. There is the judiciary plan presented by the Judiciary Committee. Col. Van Cise and his committee have worked long, hard and diligently
in developing' this plan. After the bar association meeting Governor Knous
will be asked to call a special session of the legislature to place a constitutional
amendment on the ballot for 1948, and to enact a new salary schedule for
judges which will go into effect for judges elected in 1948. The decisions
made by the Colorado Bar Association at this time may well have a greater
effect on Colorado life than anything ever done by the bar association as a
unit at any time heretofore.
Under the proposed plan judges will be selected on a non-partisan basis.
They will be appointed instead of elected. Justices of the peace will be
abolished, and magistrates of the county court instituted. An administrative
office will be established. These and other elements of the plan are important
and far-reaching. Every lawyer should be present and participate in the
decision so that every lawyer will be a part of the plan to improve our
judicial structure.
Another important decision will be on the proposed amendments to the
by-laws. The first proposed amendment is:
Amend Subsection 1 of Section 11, of Article V, of the by-laws, by
striking the first word "select" and inserting in lieu thereof the words,
"elect by vote of its members taken by mail or at a meeting of the association," and by striking the last word "selected" and inserting in lieu
thereof the word "elected," so that the subsection will read:
"Section 11 (1). Each affiliated association shall elect by vote of its
members taken by mail or at a meeting of the association one Governor
for each one hundred, or fraction thereof, of its members in good standing.
At its first meetings the Board shall determine by lot which members,
being approximately one-half, shall serve for one year, and the remaining members shall serve for two years; and thereafter the term of each
Governor so elected shall be for two years."
Amend Subsection 2 of Section 11, of Article V, of the by-laws by
striking the word "select" and inserting in lieu thereof the word "elect"
and by striking the word "selected" and inserting in lieu thereof the
word "elected"; also in the second paragraph after the second word
"association" by inserting the words, "by election by its members or by
appointment by its President," so that the subsection will read:
"Section 11 (2). If any affiliated association shall fail to elect and
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certify a Governor to the Secretary prior to any annual meeting, or if
any Governor so elected shall be absent at any annual meeting, a vacancy
may be declared, and the vacancy shall be filled by a majority vote of
the members present.
"If a representative of any affiliated association shall, between annual meetings, cease to be a member of the Board, the vacancy shall be
filled by such association by election by its members or by appointment
by its President within thirty days, and if it fails to act within such
time, the Board of Governors may fill the vacancy."
Under this amendment, all members of the board of governors would be
elected by their local associations. At present, each local association selects
its governors as it sees flit. Some local associations, as the Denver Bar Association, allow their governors to be appointed by the president of the local
association. The board of governors should be directly representative of the
members of the association, and responsive to them. This can be done only
if the members of the board of governors are elected.
The other amendment is:
Amend Section 10, of Article V, of the by-laws by adding the following paragraph, to-wit:
"At each annual meeting of the Association the Board of Governors
shall make to the Association a report of all decisions made by it during
the preceding year and of its recommendations for proposed action to
be taken by the Association."
This amendment would require the board of governors to keep the
association advised as to its actions. In this manner the members of the association will know what the board of governors decides, and what the program
of the board of governors for the association is.

Denver Bar Association October Meeting
At the October 6, 1947, meeting of the Denver Bar Association, the
following amendment to the by-laws of the association was adopted:
"Resolved that Article III A of the By-Laws of the Denver Bar
Association be amended to read as follows:
"Section 1. The President and Secretary of The Denver Bar Association shall, during their respective terms in office, serve as representatives of this Association on the Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar
Association. All other representatives to which this association may be
entitled shall be nominated as provided in Article VI, Section 3, and
elected by the association by a vote of its members at a regular meeting.
Those governors first elected after the adoption of this by-law shall determine by lot which members, being approximately one-half, shall serve
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for one year, and the remaining governors shall serve for two years;
thereafter the term of each governor so elected shall be for two years.
"If any governor shall cease to be a member of the Board at any
time, the vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the President within
thirty days."
At the same meeting, the following applicants were admitted to membership in the Denver Bar Association:
Charles Edward Bennett
David V. Dunklee
Ruth Gillespie
Martin J. Harrington
Paul V. Hodges, Jr.
Robert E. Holland

Edwin A. Jersin
Robert M. Johnson
Gerald A. Kay
Kenneth M. MacIntosh
Robert F. Welborn
Byron R. White

The meeting was devoted to a discussion of the judiciary plan submitted
by the Judiciary Committee of the Colorado Bar Association. Stanley H.
Johnson, Executive Secretary of the committee, presented the plan and there
was some discussion of it, but no action was taken by the association.

Lawyers in the Public Service
L. PHILLIPS has been elected chairman of the
council which will conduct the Survey of the Contemporary Legal Profession
in America. Judge Phillips is a member of the council of the American Law
Institute.
SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGE ORIE

JOHN C. YOUNG, Colorado Springs, former chief justice of the Colorado
Supreme Court, has been appointed by Governor Knous to the newly created
advisory committee of the Colorado Highway Safety Council. While chief
justice, Judge Young took an active part in the promotion of highway safety
conferences and has been a member of the Colorado Bar Association committee on Traffic Courts.
LOWELL WHITE, Denver, has been elected president of the International
Association of Insurance Counsel.

Denver, was elected senior vice commander of the Disabled Veterans at the organization's 25th annual convention at Las Vegas,
Nevada.
ALBERT RADINSKY,

D. NEFF, former municipal judge of Denver, has been appointed
U. S. commissioner by Judge Symes. He will serve with present commissioner
Harold Oakes.
JOSEPH
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L. OLSON, Trinidad, has been appointed as U. S. commissioner to
serve the Trinidad area by Judge Symes. Mr. Olson has served as police judge
of Trinidad, assistant attorney general and deputy district attorney for the
third district.
ARTHUR

F. PRICE, who has been dean of the colleges of business administration
and law of the University of Denver since 1945, has been appointed acting
chancellor of the university to serve until a successor to Chancellor Gates,
who recently resigned, has been selected.
JAMES

R. WILLIAM COFFEY has been appoinited director of the downtown division
of Regis College, at 711 17th St., Denver. Mr. Coffey was assistant registrar
and instructor at Westminster Law School last year.
E. HICKEY has been appointed municipal judge of Denver, taking the
position created when the city council recently added another judgeship in
the Municipal Court. Judge Hickey, a member of the board of governors of
the Colorado Bar Association, was, prior to his appointment, enforcement
attorney for the 0. P. A.
FRANK

C. DAY, JR., Denver, has been appointed justice of the peace to succeed Warren B. Hale, who has resigned. Judge Day was, prior to his appointment, area rent director.
EDWARD

E. MCCARTHY has been appointed assistant city attorney in Denver
and assigned to the Municipal Court. He fills a position recently created
when the city council added another judgeship to the Municipal Court.
THOMAS

H. JOHNSON has been appointed Manager of Safety and Excise of
Denver to succeed Gordon Nicholson who has resigned. Mr. Johnson was
formerly judge of the Juvenile Court, judge of the District Court, and is at
present executive secretary of the Judiciary Committee of the Colorado Bar
Association. It is expected that the new Denver charter will abolish the
job which Mr. Johnson now fills.
STANLEY

Hope Springs Eternal
A large Denver law firm recently received the following letter to buoy-up
its hopes for future business, to-wit:
"Thank you for your letter of the 12th inst. Evidently the
mining company stock which you investigated for me is now
worthless.
"It may interest you to know that I am on the eve of my 99th
birthday.
"Thank you for your kindly service. I will remember you with
any other business I may have that will compensate you."

218

DICTA

The Declaratory Action
By DUKE DUVALL

Of the Oklahoma City bar. An address before the
Annual Conference of the Tenth Judicial Circuit,
Denver, Colorado, June 16, 1947.
Introduction
The concept of a government of laws and not of men is a highly developed social accomplishment. The function of the judicial branch of government in modern society is a long step from enforcement of an individual's
rights by his own might or the later trial by combat. So, too, is the declaratory
action a very much more civilized procedure than action for redress of violated
rights. Its purpose is to provide a speedy adjudication of the legal rights,
duties or status of the respective parties before there has been a breach of
rights or a wrong committed.' It affords judicial help before the "dishes
are broken" rather than providing the cement to patch them after the delict
is an accomplished fact. Cutting across the entire field of civil rights jurisprudence, it is an elastic instrumentality for the application of the substantive
law, and a most useful tool in the administration of justice. Illustrations of
its utility will be pointed out later.
Of the six states comprising the Tenth Circuit, Oklahoma alone remains
one of the fast diminishing group of states, now only five in number, which
law the Uniform Declaratory Judghas not incorporated into its statutory
2
ment Act, or acts patterned after it.
History
Contrary to the wide-spread belief, the declaratory action is not a novel
form of procedure. Rooted in the Roman law of antiquity, it spread to
continental Europe, and through Scotland, from the declaratory action of
the middle ages to modern English law. Through the efforts of Lord
Broughan, begun in 1828, England adopted this procedure in 1852, and it4
is now in extensive use there and in her colonies from India to Canada.
Today, sixty per cent of all causes of an equitable nature in Great Britain
5
and its possessions are adjudicated in the form of a declaratory action.
Indeed, in this country, declaratory judgments have been rendered by
the courts for many years, prior to the adoption of a formal statutory proceeding. For example, the quiet title action does nothing more than to declare
the interest of persons in property. Other forms are interpleader actions
' 1 C.J.S., page 1022, "Actions," section 18(3).
'All except Arkansas, Delaware, Louisiana, Mississippi and Oklahoma. In 1945
Illinois became the forty-third state to pass such a statute. Historical Note to Illinois
Statutes, Anno. ch. 110, sec. 181.1.
'Borchard (2d Ed.), "Declaratory Judgments," ch. 3.
'Sheldon v. Powell, (Fla.) 128 So. 258.
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and actions of fiduciaries for instructions. In the past ten years, the action
has really come into its own with the impetus given by the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227, 81 L. Ed. 617, 108 A.L.R. 1000.
A good point to begin a review of the growth of the modern statutory
procedure is with a discussion involving the constitutionality of the declaratory judgment act-Anway v. Grand Rapids Railway Company, (1920)
179 N.W. 350, wherein the Supreme Court of Michigan struck down an
act adopted by that state in 1919, by holding it unconstitutional on the
ground that it called upon the court to perform a non-judicial function. The
court failed to take into consideration the distinction between advisory cases
and the adjudication of moot cases where the judgment would have not been
final (as in Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, appx., 76 L. Ed. 1347),
those in which there were no adverse parties (as in Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346, 55 L. Ed. 26), and a real declaratory judgment action involving an actual justiciable controversy.
Fortunately, in 1933, the United States Supreme Court changed the
situation in Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Company v. Wallace,
288 U.S. 249, 77 L. Ed. 730, by an unanimous opinion in upholding the
Uniform Declaratory Act which Tennessee adopted in 1923. The suit was
instituted by the railway company to determine its liability or non-liability
for a gasoline tax which the state of Tennessee was attempting to exact from
it. In the discussion of the constitutional limitation of the judicial function
being confined to the decision of "cases" and "controversies", Justice Stone,
speaking for the court, said:
"The judiciary clause of the constitution defined and limited judicial
power, not the particular method by which the power might be invoked.
It did not crystallize into changeless form the procedure of 1789 as the
only possible means of presenting a case or controversy otherwise cognizable by the federal courts."
Since this decision there have been no doubts of the declaratory action being
a proper exercise of the constitutional judicial function.
The next decision of great importance in this field was that of Willing
v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 277 U.S. 274, 72 L. Ed. 880, which
pointedly showed the need of the declaratory action and was a factor in
bringing about adoption of the federal act six years later. A valuable piece
of real estate in Chicago had been leased for a long term and the lessees
erected a structure called the Auditorium Building. After it had stood for
forty years it became unprofitable, and the lessees desired to raze the structure and construct a modern commercial building. The lease was not clear
on the lessees' right to demolish the existing building and the lessors refused
to consent except upon payment of a higher rent. The banking interests
which were going to advance fifteen million dollars for the erection of the
new building would not do so under the uncertainties prevailing. Lessees
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began an action to remove a cloud upon or quiet their title. But the United
States Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis, held that there
was no cloud as no second instrument had been filed of record and that the
lessees had no standing in court because:
"What the plaintiff seeks is simply a declaratory judgment. To
grant that relief is beyond the power conferred upon the federal
judiciary."
The court, in effect, held that it was necessary for the lessees to take the
dangerous step of tearing down the building at the peril of guessing wrong
and subjecting themselves to a large suit for damages, before they could get
a judicial construction of the lease.
The federal act, signed by President Roosevelt in 1934, remedied the
lack of power or supposed lack of the national courts to render declaratory
judgments. In common with a number of other jurisdictions and the federal
courts prior to the adoption of declaratory judgment acts, the conception
in Oklahoma of an action which is within the power of the judiciary to
entertain and determine is expressed thus by our court:
"In its legal significance, under our statutes, a cause of action is
a wrong for which a remedy is prescribed by law, or afforded in equity.
The delict and the remedy are the primary elements-the essential
elements. The wrong per se, if it be a wrong for which a remedy is
afforded constitutes the cause of action; it is the wrong and the right
to redress which unite to constitute the cause of action." Security Nati.
Bank v. Geck, 96 Okla. 89, 220 Pac. 373.
This is the familiar narrow view that there are three prerequisites to court
action: a right, its invasion and a particular type of tradition or remedy to
fit it. (Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Assn., supra.) Decisions to this effect
ignore the fact that such familiar actions as the quiet title suit, interpleader
actions, will construction proceedings and the like, are essentially nothing
more than declaratory actions. No difficulty is found in them presenting
situations appropriate for judicial relief.
The declaratory judgment procedure dispenses with the old conditions
precedent, of a right, a wrong and a remedy requisite for a justiciable controversy. It does not require that the plaintiff first suffer a "wrong" as a
condition to judicial relief.
Nature, Statutory Provisions and Purposes
The distinctive characteristic of the declaratory judgment is that it
merely adjudicates the legal issues between the parties, without providing
for the coercive action of execution or performance. Except for the absence
in the prayer for coercive relief the petition or complaint differs in no material respect from the form in traditional types of actions.8
' 16 American Jurisprudence, p. 275; 1 C. J. S., p. 1018; Borchard, p. 25.
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There are three principal kinds of judgment: (1) the executory judgment, which provides for execution, specific performance, injunction, etc.,
which is the most common; (2) the constitutive or investive, which creates
a new legal relation, such as judgments of partition, annulment of marriage,
dissolution of partnership, or those sanctioning a new relationship, e.g.,
appointments of receivers, guardians, the admission of will to probate, and
the like; (3) the declaratory judgment which 7 only adjudicates or finally
determines rights, status or other legal relations.
Although at present Oklahoma barristers have available only the federal
act,8 since it substantially embodies the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act 9
and is in such highly concentrated form (five sentences, to be exact), it is
believed that an examination of the text of the uniform act and particularly,
the first four sections, will furnish a more ready understanding of the functions of the procedure.
The first of these provides:
"Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have
power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or
not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall
be open to the objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or
decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such declarations shall have the force and
effect of a final judgment or decree."
These provisions are treated and analyzed in detail infra. In furtherance and
not in limitation of this general scope of power conferred, 10 it provides specific
power of construction of written instruments, including statutes and ordinances, in section two, which is:
"Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other
writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or fran,Borchard, p. 22, et seq.
'U.S.C. 400. A model of legislative draftsmanship in its brevity and simplicity, it provides:
"(1) In cases of actual controversy (except with respect to federal taxes)
the courts of the United States shall have power upon petition, declaration, complaint, or other appropriate pleadings to declare rights and other legal relations
of any interested party petitioning for such declaration, whether or not further
relief is or could be prayed, and such declaration shall have the force and effect
of a final judgment or decree and be reviewable as such.
"(2) Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be
granted whenever necessary or proper. The application shall be by petition to
a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application be deemed
sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party, whose
rights have been adjudicated by the declaration, to show cause why further
relief should not be granted forthwith.
"(3) When a declaration of right or the granting of further relief based
thereon shall involve the determination of issues of fact triable by a jury, such
issues may be submitted to a jury in the form of interrogatories, with proper
instructions by the court, whether a general verdict be required or not."
' Uniform Laws Annotated, vol. 9, p. 215; Borchard, appendix, p. 1039.
"Section 5 expressly so states.
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chise, may have determined question of construction or validity arising
under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and
obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder."
An important function of the procedure, usually available in no other
way prior to breach, is found in section 3:
"A contract may be construed either before or after there has been
a breach thereof."
The fourth section, which relates to fiduciaries, confers the power upon
the court, at the instance of any interested party, to declare rights or legal
relations of "any person interested as or through an executor, administrator,
trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of
kin, or cestui que trust, in the administration of a trust, or of the estate of a
decedent, an infant, lunatic or insolvent . . ."
The remaining sections relate to the manner of construction, preservation of right of jury trial as in other cases, right of review and the like.
The purpose of the procedure is formally stated in section 12 as being
"to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect
to rights, status and other legal relations." A more colorful epitomization is
found in the famous statement of Congressman Gilbert in the congressional
debate on the federal act:
"Under the present law you take a step in the dark and then turn
on the light to see if you have stepped into a hole. Under the declara;
tory judgment law you turn on the light and then take a step."
The declaratory judgment is essentially one of construction." The declaratory
remedy is cumulative and alternative-not exclusive. This is very important
to keep in mind. Although an alternative remedy is available, this does not
bar the use of the declaratory action. Federal Rule 57 expressly provides:
"The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a
judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate."
To the same effect is section 1 of the uniform act.
By the same token, this form of relief does not supersede the traditional
types of remedy. It is supplementary to and not a substitute for and does
12
not supplant existing remedies.
In this connection, it should be remembered that the declaratory action
may be invoked in two types of situations: first, those where no other remedy
is available, e.g., where plaintiff seeks a construction of a contract before
its breach; second, where an alternate, coercive action is available, e.g., where
plaintiff desires a determination of another's right to build a certain type of
structure under plat restrictions, he could bring either a declaratory action
13
or one for an injunction.
The declaratory action is a special form of action-sui generis. It is
neither legal nor equitable, taking on the color of either depending upon the
" Newsum v. Interstate Realty Company, (Tenn.) 278 S.W. 56.
12 Anderson, "Declaratory Judgments," sec. 48, p. 140; 16 American Jurisprudence,
p. 281, note 20.
iS Borchard, p.
315, et seq.
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nature of the particular facts and controversy involved. 14 In view of the
abolition in the federal courts and most state courts of the distinction between
law and equity actions, exactly the same considerations determine the right
to a trial by jury 15 in the declaratory action as in any other type of case.',
No substantive rights or jurisdictional factors are within the scope of
the declaratory acts, which are entirely procedural. Therefore, the jurisdicthereunder is no greater or different than in the
tion of the courts in actions
7
coercive form of action.1
Essentials
The requisite conditions and precedents which must be shown in order
to obtain declaratory relief, in addition to jurisdictional requirements which
have been noted to be the same as in other types of actions, are generally
stated to be:' 8
1. There must be a justiciable controversy; that is, a controversy "that
is appropriate for judicial determination"; one that is not of "hypothetical
or abstract character" or that is "academic or moot."
2. The controversy must be between parties whose interests are adverse.
3. There must be a tangible legal interest in the controversy by the party
asserting it.
4. The issue presented must be ripe for adjudication.
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY
The authorities give a great deal of consideration to this essential of
the procedure. The declaratory statutes are said to have greatly enlarged
the scope of this phrase, in that they make appropriate for judicial determination disputes over legal rights before there has been an invasion of such
rights or a wrong committed. 19 Prior to the federal act, a "wrong" was held
1 Anderson, sec. 56; Borchard, p. 239; Moss v. Moss, (Cal.) 128 Pac. (2d) 526,
141 A.L.R., 1422; Sanders v. L. 6' N. Railway Company, (6th Cir.) 144 Fed. (2d) 485.
" Right of jury trial is expressly prescribed in both the Federal and the Uniform
Acts.
. Hargrove v. American Cent. Insurance Company, (10th Cir., Okla.) 125 Fed.
(2d) 225; Federal Rules 57 and 59; Section 9, Uniform Act: "When a proceeding
under this act involves the determination of an issue of fact such issue may be tried
and determined in the same manner as issues of fact are tried and determined in other
civil actions in the court in which the proceeding is pending." See, also, 16 American

Jurisprudence, p. 337; 1 C.J.S., p. 1031.
" Tennessee Coal & Iron Company v. Muscoda Local 123, (3rd Cir.) 137 Fed.
(2d) 176, affirmed 321 U.S. 590, 88 L.Ed. 949; Anderson, sec. 24, p. 81; 16 American
Jurisprudence, p. 324, sec. 52: Borchard, p. 231.
"Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 81 L.Ed. 617, 108
A.L.R., 1000; Anderson, sec. 42, p. 125; Borchard, p. 29; 1 C.J.S., p. 1023, "Actions,"
sec. 18 (5).
"Some Practical Uses of the Declaratory Judg" 1 C.J.J., p. 1022, sec. 18 (3).
inent Law," Dean C. S. Potts, S. M. U. Law School, 23 Nebraska Law Review, October, 1944, p. 185; "The Next Step Beyond Equity-The Declaratory Action," by
Professor Borchard, Chicago Law Review, February, 1946.
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to be indispensable to justiciability. 20 Though such reasoning has been criticized, as no "wrong" or "threatened wrong"
is necessary to a "cause of action"
21
for partition, quieting title, and the like.
The leading case on this feature is the United States Supreme Court's
decision of Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Haworth,22 which vitalized
the federal act and gave great impetus to the declaratory procedure. This
decision gave a more liberal construction to the term than many courts had
been doing, and started a new trend. Therefore, cases decided prior to 1938
must be examined with a critical eye. The importance and great impact of
the decision upon this field of procedure justify an examination of its holding.
Haworth had five life policies with plaintiff, which provided for waiver
of premiums in event of his permanent total disability. Haworth notified the
company he claimed these benefits, and quit paying premiums. Aetna had
cause to believe his condition wac not such as to entitle the insured to the
benefits, but was legally compelled to set up reserves against the policies. It
was confronted with the dilemma of waiting until Haworth died (keeping
the reserves up meanwhile) and defending a dangerous suit by the widow
beneficiary, or to take the initiative in some way itself.
Bringing a declaratory judgment action, Aetna asserted the "no-right"
of the defendant Haworth to the benefits of the premium-waiver clause, and
that the court adjudicate that the policies had lapsed and declare the Aetna
owed no obligation upon them. Trial Judge Otis, giving a narrow construction to the act which would have taken the heart out of it if allowed to
stand, as grounds for dismissal of the action, held:
"There is now only a potential controversy, but no present actual
controversy. How can there be a controversy relating to a breach of
contract unless it is initiated by him who asserts the breach and claims
damages therefor?"
The circuit court, adding nails to the coffin of the corpse of the Declaratory
Judgment Act, said in affirming the trial court and holding that the action
presented no justiciable controversy:
"It fails in this because the facts averred do not show that any
right of the plaintiff is presently being invaded or imminently and prejudicially affected by the alleged acts of the defendants. The judicial
power of the federal courts does not extend to such vague and indefinite
questions."
In other words, it was held by the two lower courts: (1) that there was no
breach-no "wrong"---and therefore no cause of action, i.e., justiciable controversy; and, (2) that an action could be initiated only by a party whose
rights had been invaded.

"Willing
'Borchard,
Supra.

v. Chicago Auditorium Asso'n., 277 U.S. 274.
p. 5.
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Fortunately, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, without
dissent, and announced the great principles which gave the breath of life to
the declaratory procedure:23
1. (a) That the power of the courts under the act extended beyond
affirmative rights of the plaintiff to "negative declarations" of non-liability
of the plaintiff or the "no-right" of the defendant. Which in effect means(b) That there could be an appropriate controversy for declaratory relief
without there first being a "wrong" (as that term is ordinarily used) committed against the plaintiff; and
(c) That the act affords a remedy to a challenger of a right (the"Aetna)
who otherwise would have to wait for an adjudication of his claim and for
relief from his insecurity and peril until his adversary took the initiative.
2. That questions of fact as well as law are adjudicable issues under
the act.
On the first point, Chief Justice Hughes said:
"It is the nature of the controversy, not the method of its presentation or the particular party who presents it, that is determinative."
On the second, he emphatically stated:
"That the dispute turns upon questions of fact does not withdraw
it, as the respondent seems to contend, from judicial cognizance. The
legal consequences flow from the facts and it is the province of the courts
to ascertain and find the facts to determine the legal consequences. That
is every day practice."
The valuable preventive function of the procedure is thus firmly established,
and that:
the judicial function may be appropriately exercised although
the adjudication of the rights of the litigants may not require the award
of process or the payment of damages,"
to use the language of the court.
But there are other considerations making up the requisite justiciable
controversy. It must involve real and concrete issues, an adjudication of
which will be of binding effect upon the parties. Moot cases or advisory
opinions on hypothetical issues are taboo. "Actions or opinions are described
as 'moot' when they are. or have become fictitious, colorable, hypothetical,
academic or dead. The distinguishing characteristic of such issues is that
the decision of which can
they involve no actual, genuine, live controversy,
24
definitely affect existing legal relations."
36 Michigan Law Review, 466; 50 Harvard Law Review, 1317; "The Declaratory Judgment-A Necessary Addition to Georgia Procedure," Georgia Bar Journal,
November, 1944.
24Moore's Federal Practice, vol. 3, p. 3206, sec. 57:03; Borchard, p. 35; Anderson, sec. 7-11; 16 American Jurisprudence, pp. 282-5; 1 C.J.S., p. 1025, sec. 18 (6);
Commercial Standard Insurance Company v. Gilmore, Gardner & Kirk Oil Company,
(10th Cir., December, 1946), 157 Fed. (2d) 929; Business Men's Assurance Company
v. Sainsbury, (10th Cir.), 110 Fed. (2d) 995.
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The action is required to be adversary in character-i.e., between a
plaintiff with a real interest in asserting the claim against a defendant interested in opposing
it. Otherwise, it is likely to be dismissed as advisory in
25
character.
Closely connected with this requirement and partly overlapping it, is
the condition that there be a real controversy, or to use the language of the
federal act, an "actual" controversy. 26 In the Haworth case this word was
held to be one of emphasis--not of definition. But troublesome borderline
problems arise over the questions: "When are parties adverse? What is
a controversy?"
The above given rules on the elements of justiciability only generally
delineate the frontiers of judicial power. That is about all that can be done.
What facts will present a justiciable controversy cannot be abstractly stated.
27
One must look to various types of cases brought for declaratory relief.
However, the act is remedial and should be liberally construed, to make it
28
as useful as possible.
With pragmatic and utilitarian objectives as criterions, courts need only
be on the lookout for the collusive, fictitious and sham law suits in applying
the test of adversary parties in a real controversy for determination of justiciability. This is equally true in considering the plaintiff's "legal" interest
in maintaining the claim and defendant's interest in opposing it.
Finally, the case must present a controversy that is sufficiently matured
for judicial decision-usually described as being "ripe" for determination.
"In a number of cases it has been held and in others intimated that the
appearance of 'ripening seeds of controversy' is sufficient." 29 The question
"is necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be possible,
to fashion a precise test. 3 0 If there is probability from human experience
that danger threatens or legal rights are in jeopardy or insecure, this is
sufficient. 31 Indeed, "potential adversaries, regardless of the position they
may take," should satisfy the requirement of a ripe and justiciable controversy. The familiar quia timet or quiet title action is nothing more than
a declaratory action confined to the particular field of settling titles to land.
It is every day practice to bring these actions against persons who may be
potential disputants over the title, altho there really have been no previous
"

'Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Haworth, supra; Ohio Casualty Company v.
Marr, (10th Cir., Okla.) 98 Fed. (2d) 973; Borchard, pp. 29-32, 38.
2"Coffman v. Breeze Corporation, 323 U. S. 316, 89 L. Ed. 264.
2 Moore, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 3207.
2Ibid;
16 American Jurisprudence, p. 282; 87 A.L.R., 1211; sec. 12 of the
Uniform Act expressly so provides.
' 16 American Jurisprudence, p. 284; Anderson, sec. 8, p. 29, et seq.
'Maryland Casualty Company v. Pacific Coal & Oil Company, 312 U.S. 270,
85 L. Ed. 826.
" Borchard, p. 637.
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threats or controversy between
plaintiff and defendants prior to the filing
3
of the quiet title action. 1
Discretion in Granting Declaration
It has been stated in a number of cases that the granting of a declaratory
judgment is discretionary with the court. This is too loose and generalized.
In the first place, it is not a discretion to entertain the action (which must
be done if jurisdictional elements exist), but a discretion to enter or83 decline
to enter the judgment after examining the facts and legal contentions.
Nor is the discretion absolute, as in the case of the granting or denial
of new trial motions 5in the federal court,34 but it is a judicial discretion
reviewable on appeal.3
"The two principal criteria guiding the policy in favor of rendering
declaratory judgments are (1) when the judgment will serve a useful purpose
in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue, and (2) when it will
terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity and controversy
giving rise to the proceeding. It follows that when neither of these results
can be accomplished, the court should decline to render the declaration
prayed."36
Discretion against declaratory relief will be exercised where another
remedy will be more effective or appropriate under the circumstancs.3 7 This
does not mean that mere availability of another remedy is sufficient grounds
for refusing relief;38 but that another form of remedy will be more effica39
cious. Utility not necessity is the test for the issuance of the declaration.
Therefore, courts may exercise discretion against the use of the declaratory actions, for example, to determine only whether negligence did or did
not exist, on the ground that the traditional action for damages would be
more effective because all the controversies would be settled, the issues would
not be tried piecemeal, 40 and that the declaratory action would serve no useful
purpose.

41

The pendency of another action is a factor properly given consideration
"Ibid, p.p. 42, 284.
"Anderson, sec. 169.
Order granting or denying motion for new trial in the Federal Courts is not
appealable or reviewable in any way. Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Yellow Cab
Operating Co., (10th Cir., Okla.) 124 Fed. (2d) 400, and cases therein cited.
'Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, (10th Cir.) 157 Fed. (2d) 653; Tenn. Coal,
Iron & R. Co. v. Muscado Local No. 123, (5th Cir.) 137 Fed. (2d) 136; 16 Amer.
Juris., p. 288, sec. 14.
Borchard, p. 299.
Ibid, pp. 302-3.
"Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, (10th Cir.) supra; Rules 57, R.F.C.P., sec. 1,
Uniform Act.
a Borchard, p. 307; 16 American Jurisprudence, p. 288, note 20; 68 A.L.R., 113;
Moore, vol. 3, p. 3203; 1 C.J.S., p. 1023, "Actions," sec. 18 (5).
" Anderson, p. 177, note 86.
"Pennsylvania Casualty Co. v. Thornton, 61 F.S. 753.
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in the exercise of judicial discretion. In this regard, there are these questions
to be answered: (1) Does the other action involve the issues presented in
the declaratory action? (2) Can the questions be as well or better presented
in the other action? (3) Was the other action filed before the declaratory
action?
the courts will exercise
If these questions are answered in the affirmative,
42
their discretion to dismiss the declaratory action.
The pendency of a state court action, for example, by an injured party
for damages for his personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident,
against an insured motorist will not affect the right of the motorist's insurance carrier to maintain a declaratory action on the question of its coverage
of the accident. The same is true as to the insured's right to maintain the
action. Manifestly, the question of insurance coverage not being involved
in the personal injury case, the issues of the declaratory action cannot be
48
settled in it.
Out of a consideration of the autonomy of states, and the harmonious
working together of the respective courts of concurrent jurisdiction of the
federal and state courts, the federal courts, in the exercise of their discretion
in declaratory proceedings, are careful to avoid "'gratuitous interference"
with state court litigation. However, where the issues of the declaratory
as fully,
action will not be determined in the pending state court suit, (1)
44
or (2) with equal facility, declaratory relief will not be denied.
In the painstaking opinion by Judge Murrah in one of the Tenth Circuit's most recent decisions in this field, Franklin Life Insurance Company v.
Johnson, 157 Fed. (2d) 653, the whole question of the effect of the pendency
of action upon the discretion to be exercised in entertaining the declaratory
action is exhaustively probed, with extensive citation of authority.
A number of important principles are pointed out in this case, e.g.:
(1) "A declaratory action, if otherwise appropriate, should not be dismissed merely because another remedy is available."
(2) "Before dismissing declaratory action because of pending proceedings in state court, federal court must ascertain whether the questions in controversy can better be settled in the state court proceedings, or whether there
is such a plain, adequate and speedy remedy afforded in the state court proceedings that the declaratory action will serve no useful purpose."
(3) "If either of two courts is to be deprived of jurisdiction because of
pendency of action in the other it must be the court to which application
was last made for relief."
1 C.J.S., p. 1029; Anderson, sec. 55; "Jurisdiction of Declaratory Judgment Actions as Affected by Pendency of Another Action or Proceeding," Annotation 135
A.L.R., 934; Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Company of America, 316 U.S. 491, 86
L.Ed. 1620.
"*Annotation, 142 A.L.R., 8, 42.
"Ibid; Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Amer. supra; and citations in footnote 35.
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(4) The "safeguards against 'procedural fencing' and races for res judicata
(see note 51, Yale Law Review, 511, 515) should not deter the courts' full
force and effect to the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U. S.
C. A. 400."
(5) It is not basis for discretionary denial of declaratory relief against
a party that his interest is dependent upon a contingency.
Every line of this decision breathes the philosophy of our circuit court
to make the procedure as utilitarian as possible within its proper realm.
Advcntages and Uses
Some of the more important4 advantages and useful features of the
declaratory action are as follows: 5
(1) Actions at law require that there be first a breach of legal relations,
as they give only redress. And one is consequently compelled to take a step
at his peril, or, as Borchard colorfully puts it, "to eat the suspect to determine
whether it be a mushroom or toadstool." The declaratory action avoids this
danger. It acts preventively, adjudicating legal duties and rights before a
breach or invasion.
(2) Actions in equity likewise require a prerequisite to a "cause of
action" that there first be a "wrong" committed or hostile activity (except
in cases like quiet title actions which are really declaratory actions). In
declaratory proceedings, the existence of an opposing claim or potential
adversary, raising doubt, insecurity or peril as to legal rights and relations,
suffices.
(3) Equitable actions must fit into a rigid mould of antiquated forms.
It none fit-no remedy. But the declaratory action can be applied to every
type of issue that can arise.
(4) Equitable relief is subject to and hedged in by numerous highly
technical requirements. The declaratory judgment is not.
(5) It is not necessary in a declaratory action sounding in equity to
establish absence of adequate remedy at law, as it is in a traditional equitable
action. Indeed, it is not required that there be no adequate remedy in equity.
(6) Prospective defendants can initiate proceedings remove uncertainty.
(7) A person is able to challenge the validity or applicability of a criminal or penal statute without first having to subject himself to its penalties.
For various reasons the injunctive remedy is frequently not available.
(8) It is speedy as it is given preference or right of advancement on the
trial calendar. (Rule 57, F.R.C.P.)
(9) Frequently the facts are stipulated, making for inexpensive trials,
as well as expeditious ones.
A comparison of one or two forms of equitable remedies will illustrate
the advantages of the declaratory procedure in that field.
' "The Next Step Beyond Equity," Borchard, University of Chicago Law Review,
vol. 2 (February, 1946) 145, 155.
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Injunction suits require a showing of no adequate legal remedy, irreparable injury, posting of a bond and the satisfying of many other ancient encrusted equitable conditions, and for other reasons may not be practical or
available. Declaratory actions require no bond, 46 no showing of absence of
adequate legal remedy 47 or threat of irreparable injury,4 no compliance
with the technicalities of equity practice, 49 and can accomplish the same
thing when an injunction would not be available; e.g., to avoid a penalty
under an ordinance requiring a license, an injunction was denied because
ordinarily equity will not enjoin enforcement of a penal law. Shredded Wheat
Company v. City of Elgin, (Ill.) 120 N.E. 248. A declaratory action would
have solved the problem there. The determination of the invalidity of the
ordinance was all that was needed. Public officials do not need the coercion
of an injunction in such a case, to compel them to obey.
A comparison of other forms of equitable remedies will develop equal
advantages of the declaratory procedure. Actions for specific performance
require the contract to be clear and free from ambiquity as a condition
precedent to enforcement. But a declaratory judgment action to construe
does not, and few people would continue to breach the contract in the face
of a declaratory judgment as to their duty to perform. Advance construction
is much better and more civilized remedy than a suit for damages, with the
latter's prerequisite of a rupture of legal relations.
A rapidly growing body of case law furnishes unlimited examples of
the utilization of the procedure. Illustrative of its use to settle legal relations
where there is a dispute, danger or uncertainty before a breach or disaster
occurs, are declaratory actions where plaintiff claims: that she is defendnat's
wife which defendant denies; 50 that the defendant lessee demands the erection
of a three-story, fire-proof building under a lease (the old one having burned),
whereas plaintiff lessor maintains he is privileged to erect a two-story building,
the new statutory limit for garages;51 that a statute requires a heavy license
fee of billiard parlors in one county only-alleged to be unconstitutional;52
lessee in 99-year lease claimed right to tear down old building and erect
53
and sublet a new one, which lessor denied.
In none of these cases was there a wrong or hostile action threatened,
but plaintiff's security and freedom of action were impaired by the doubt
of his legal rights and relations. The declaratory judgment procedure supplied a great need.
Before and after breach, the construction of contracts of every kind
& F Assets Realization Corporation v. Hull, 311 U.S. 470, 85 L. Ed. 288.
"' Rule 57, F.R.C.P.
"Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Wallace, supra.
"Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local 123, supra.
"Henry v. Henry, (N. J.) 144 Atl. 18; Bauman v. Bauman, 229 N.Y.S. 833
(validity of Mexican divorce).
"' Girard Trust Co. v. Trembley Motor Co., (Pa.) 140 Atl. 506.
52 Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, (Tenn.)
300 S.W. 565.
"'Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, (Mich.) 229 N.W. 218.
46Z
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and character has been one of the most prolific and valuable uses of the
procedure. 54 Every kind of question imaginable involving insurance policies
55
has been presented for declaration thereon by both insurers and insureds.
Declaratory judgments have adjudicated: whether a contract was
formed;-56 whether invalid or voidable, such as for fraud, usury, violative of
constitution, statute, ordinance, public policy, or being made without power
or authority; 57 the validity or invalidity of bonds and warrants; 58 meaning
and effect of terms of contracts, as well as other written instruments such
as wills, trusts, etc.5"
Before violating a statute or ordinance to determine its validity or applicability to one's business or status, the declaratory judgment has been used
"to turn on the light" before taking a step at one's peril.60 For example, the
declaratory procedure was used to determine: the constitutionality of the
federal act under the interstate commerce clause; 61 the issues as to an electric
light company's rights under a franchise ordinance the validity of which was
questioned;62 right to construct a filling station where a zoning statute and
ordinance were asserted as prohibiting; 3 actions to determine constitutionality
64
of a statute regulating pharmacies by one denied a license.
Also, "declaratory judgments and orders as to the rights, powers, duties
and obligations of public officers, boards and other public authorities have
been made in many cases." 6 5 With the great growth of government by adAnderson, ch. 20, p. 831.

ministrative boards and officials, this is a most helpful function of the procedure. Caution must be used, however, to see that there is a ripened
justiciable controversy in this type of declaratory action. 6
To avoid insecurity, peril, incurring penalties, or otherwise getting into
hot water, the procedure has been used to determine tax problems (with the
exception of federal taxes expressly excluded in federal act) ;67 issues as to
162 A.L.R. 756, Annotation on "Application of Declaratory Judgment to Ques,
tions in Respect to Contracts or Alleged Contracts."
4' 142 A.L.R. 8, annotation; 103 A.L.R. 1005, annotation; "Declaratory Judgments
in Liability Insurance Cases," Insurance Counsel Journal, (October, 1946) vol. 13, no. 4.
"Big Cola Corporation v. World Bottling Co., (6th Cir.) 134 Fed. (2d) 718.
162 A.L.R. at 763.6.
T
Ibid, 767-9.
"9 U.L.A. sections 2 and 3, and cases thereunder; "Challenging 'Penal' Statutes
by Declaratory Action" (Borchard).
" Yale Law Journal, 445; Anderson, ch. 16, p. 783; 16 Amer. Jur., p. 296.
" Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 83 L. Ed. 441.
'City of Manhattan v. United Power & Light Corp., (Kan.) 283 Pac. 919.
'Faulkner v. City of-Keene, (N. H.) 155 Atl. 195.
"Pratter v. Lascoff, 249 N.Y.S. 211, affirmed 185 N.E. 716, cer. denied 289
U.S. 754; followed in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 73 L. Ed. 204.
17 Amer. Juris., p. 318, note 6, citing annotations containing many examples;
" 149 A.L.R. 349, Annotation on justiciable controversy a predicable on advice,
opinion or ruling of public or administrative officer.
"Moore, vol. 3, p. 3216; 16 American Jurisprudence, pp. 322-3; Anderson, ch.
11,p. 669.
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patents and infringement thereof;68 questions of citizenship; 69 and many
others illustrating the practical value of the procedure.
Practice and Procedure
The procedural aspects of the declaratory action will present no difficulty, even to one using the action for the first time, because they are the
same as in the traditional type of action. 70 Rule 57 F.R.C.P. specifically
provides:
"The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment shall be in
accordance with these rules."
This puts the action in the same procedural category as any other civil action.
The same is true in states operating under state statutes.
The petition or complaint sets up the jurisdictional elements, the facts
of the controversy, and the relief claimed. The only difference from other
actions is that the prayer asks for a declaration instead of a coercive judgment for money and execution therefor, or for performance; e.g., an action
for a declaration that a plat restriction validity prohibited the erection of
business building instead of an injunction enjoining construction of such a
proposed structure.
A helpful set of annotated forms of declaratory pleadings is given by
Anderson in chapter 7, page 311, and may be found in standard form books
generally, including the new Oklahoma form book by Kleinschmidt and
Highley (1946).
Venue, service of process and jurisdiction are likewise governed by the
same rules as in other types of cases.71
In the matter of practice and trial, the same familiar rules govern declaratory actions as in other cases, though the declaratory procedure has been
The right of
found to be much more conducive to stipulation of the facts.
72
a jury trial is determined in the same way as in other actions.
Likewise, in declaratory actions, as in others, consideration will be 7given
3
the effect of the statute of limitations and laches on the cause of action.
actions.

There may be combined with the prayer for declaratory relief, a request
for the traditional applicable type of coercive relief; 74 and this has great
advantages. For example, you might not establish a right to the injunction
you pray for, where the evidence would be sufficient for a declaratory judgment in your favor. This would be a consideration in other types of actions,
Borchard, p. 802; Moore, p. 3212; 45 Yale L.J., 1287.
'Perkins v. Elg., 307 U.S. 325, 83 L. Ed. 1320.
7Moore, vol. 3, p. 3223; Anderson, ch. 6, "Pleading, Practice and Procedure,"
p. 205; 16 American Jurisprudence, p. 323.
" Ibid; also, 149 A.L.R., 1103, annotation.
" Discussed ante; 131 A.L.R., 218, Moore, vol. 3, p. 3331.
1- 151 A.L.R., 1076, annotation-Statute of limitations and laches in declaratory
"4Annotation, 155 A.L.R., 501.
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such as specific performance, reformation, recission, etc. And the declaratory
sufficient to settle the dispute even though the coercive
judgment would be
75
relief was denied.
Where the .declaratory judgment alone does not give sufficient relief or
is not obeyed, both the federal and uniform acts provide for application for
additional relief; the former states:
"Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be
granted whenever necessary or proper,"
upon application and notice thereof to the opposite parties.
Such supplemental relief is not limited to7 6 further declaratory relief, but
coercive enforcement provision may be made.
The declaratory judgment is a conclusive determination of the rights
the same weight as any other judgment under prinof the parties, and carries
7
ciple of res judicata. 7
The declaratory judgment, being a final judgment, is appealable and
reviewable as such. Both the federal and uniform acts expressly so provide.
And, as in the case78of practice, the same rules of procedure govern as in
other types of cases.
When it is said that the principle uses for the declaratory procedure for
the settlement of controversies lie in the field of: (1) personal status; (2)
the validity and construction of all types of written instruments, including
contracts, deeds, leases, mortgages, liens, corporation and partnership documents, insurance policies, statutes, patents and wills; (3) facts, future interests, trusts, titles to property; and (4) administrative duties and powers,
elections, public officers, and taxation-there is little left in the field of
litigation.
"It serves a most important social function in settling disputed rights
at the inception of the controversy, saves from destruction and violence an
existing status quo, preserves contracts against threatened breach, holds parties
to their contractual and statutory duties and avoids the economic and social
damage which breach would entail. It acts as a preventative and conservatory measure, saving existing relationships." Issue is joined while the relationship still exists. Conversely, it enables one to secure an adjudication of his
right to take action, to change his status quo, in advance of taking the step
at the peril of penalty, damages or forfeiture.
"Annotation-Combining actions for declaratory and coercive relief, 155 A.L.R.,
501; Advantages thereof, Borchard, 432.
"6Anderson, sec. 193, p. 573; 1 C.J.S., p. 1058; Borchard.
" Ibid, p. 438, et seq.; 16 American Jurisprudence, pp. 342-4; 101 A.L.R. 694.
"' Anderson, p. 607; 16 American Jurisprudence, p. 341.
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